Review symposium: the democratic case for partisanship by White, Jonathan & Ypi, Lea
  
Jonathan White and Lea Ypi 
Review symposium: the democratic case 
for partisanship 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
White, Jonathan and Ypi, Lea (2018) Review symposium: the democratic case for 
partisanship. Political Theory. ISSN 0090-5917 
 
DOI: 10.1177/0090591717744744 
 
© 2018 The Authors 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87308/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 1 
The Democratic Case for Partisanship 
Jonathan White and Lea Ypi 
 
 
The Meaning of Partisanship is a book that restores the place of parties in political theory. It 
approaches partisan practices both from an external perspective, focused on their distinctive 
place in wider processes of democratic justification, and from an internal perspective, 
focused on the ethics of activism and its contribution to political commitment.  
Our interlocutors rightly point out that our account is markedly different from 
other recent perspectives, most notably those of Nancy Rosenblum and Russell Muirhead.1 
Unlike their contributions, the argument of our book is a democratic rather than a liberal 
one.  It interprets parties and the associative practices underpinning them as an essential 
component of the process by which political power can be endowed with legitimacy. Our 
account, of course, is not hostile to elements emphasised by these liberal alternatives.  Like 
Muirhead for example, we acknowledge the role of partisan loyalty in supporting political 
commitment. And like Rosenblum, we emphasise the importance of partisanship in 
channelling political disagreement into forms of regulated rivalry. But while these 
alternative accounts take issue with an ideal of deliberation that seeks to develop shared 
standards of public reason-giving, partisanship for us is not only compatible with and 
constrained by these standards but also a practice that contributes to them.  
In our account, parties differ from factions precisely in their ability to articulate 
principles and aims that meet deliberative criteria for reason-giving, i.e. general and 
reciprocal justifiability. For our liberal critics, this raises the question of the compatibility 
between such an ideal stance on justification (a commitment to reasons that can be shared 
or, in the case of partisanship, to principles and aims that claim to be generalizable and 
reciprocally justified) and the reality of sharp disagreement that pervades many aspects of 
political life. Muirhead’s contribution in this journal proceeds from this contrast to develop 
two important lines of critique. In one, the demand for justification on which our defence of 
partisanship is grounded ‘invites a diminution of (perhaps eradication of) disagreement’ (p. 
XXX). In the other, this very same demand may “intensify disagreement, and make common 
decisions both elusive and contentious” (p. XXX). When the latter is the case, “deep, 
persistent disagreement might reign even when parties succeed in serving the philosophic 
cause of justification” (p. XXX). 
There seems to be a tension between these two critiques. Either the demands for 
justification diminish or even eradicate disagreement, or they serve to exacerbate it.  It is not 
                                                        
1 Rosenblum 2008 and Muirhead 2014. 
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clear that they can do both. The problem for the liberal account that Muirhead promotes is 
that whichever version of the critique one chooses, it undermines the case for a liberal 
defence of partisanship as much as a democratic one. Recall the liberal defence of 
partisanship as a form of regulated rivalry in the face of the necessity to avoid violence in 
politics. If one emphasises persistent disagreement, where does one find the agreed standard 
on which the ‘regulated’ part of ‘regulated rivalry’ depends? How does that standard get 
constructed? Public reason is surely an essential part of this, even in the minimal form it 
takes in the liberal account. On the other hand, if one emphasises the danger that through 
mere appeal to justification the benefits of disagreement are eradicated, one seems to 
collapse the distinction between an ideal of partisanship (however minimal) and the political 
reality of it. Yet this is a distinction to which even the less demanding accounts of 
partisanship must be committed, else they descend into a mere endorsement of realpolitik.  
Muirhead acknowledges this point in distinguishing between two versions of 
legitimacy: a ‘philosophical’ one which emphasises the importance of the justification of 
power based on reasons that claim general acceptability, and a ‘sociological’ one that 
commands obedience even when particular decisions made by citizens are considered to be 
‘disagreeable’. There is no reason, he suggests, to assume that the two overlap. But here one 
might wonder whether the contrast is not too sharp. The interesting and pertinent question is 
not whether there is a reliable overlap between the two but how one might conceptualise 
existing political practices so as to critically scrutinise their de facto (or sociological) 
legitimacy. Those who are interested in democratic agency are typically interested in real 
forms of collective self-rule, not their mere philosophical idealisation. At the same time, 
they emphasise that real political agency ought to be constrained by certain norms of 
argumentation so as to ward off descent into the kinds of selfish, asymmetric or 
manipulative forms of discourse that are conducive to abuses of power. The boundary 
between philosophical and sociological legitimacy-conferring practices is therefore more 
fluid than the contrast suggests. Our argument is that partisan agency, correctly understood, 
has the potential to contribute constructively to this process.  This, in response to 
Muirhead’s question, is why it is crucial that partisans adhere to standards of political 
justification. 
The book aims to defend partisanship both from the perspective of democratic 
values and from the perspective of those who might align themselves with a particular party.  
From this derives the twin focus on justification on the one hand and the epistemic and 
motivational empowerment of individuals on the other.  A natural concern may be that the 
two dimensions are less consonant than we suggest.  Muirhead plausibly asks whether this is 
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not the source of a tension in the book.  Partisanship as a mode of public justification points, 
he suggests, to a potentially quite dry intellectual exercise, the preserve perhaps of an 
educated elite.  To seek reasons that ‘all can accept’ is to adopt the stance of the philosopher.  
Partisanship on the other hand, as a mode in which individuals develop and refine their 
political commitments, points towards something more inclusive and involved.  It is politics 
in the vernacular, combative and raw.  ‘The two pull in opposing directions’ (Muirhead 
p.XXX).   
Our understanding of partisan justification is not quite so esoteric.  By 
emphasising the generalizability of partisan claims, we wanted to reassert the core of 
partisanship as a politics of principle, something more than the interest- and identity-politics 
it has too often come to be equated with.  Partisanship is not about by-passing considerations 
of interest and identity in the name of universal reason, but seeking to embed them in a 
normative argument that explains which interests and identities are worth pursuing and why. 
Certainly, it is possible for debates on such questions to be had in a detached, philosophical 
register, technical in style and of narrow societal appeal.  But the partisan way is to pursue 
them through political institutions and political activism.  It is about enlisting adherents to a 
principled cause, one that can only prosper if couched in a popular idiom.  The emergence of 
the Bernie Sanders Democrats, or the hundreds of thousands of citizens who recently joined 
the UK Labour party and propelled its gains in the June 2017 General Election, are just 
some examples of contemporary partisan projects that suggest a politics of principle need 
not be of merely elite interest.  One should be wary of setting up a trade-off between 
political justification and activism. 
Muirhead’s concern is not just that there may be a tension between justification 
and activism.  His suggestion is that one is more important than the other, and that to 
approach them too even-handedly leads one to overlook partisanship’s true worth.  Popular 
mobilisation is the real contribution of partisanship to democracy; seeking to balance this 
dimension with norms of justification, even if striking such a balance in real-world politics 
is just about conceivable, tilts the activity away from where its focus should be. 
We are certainly not averse to emphasising partisanship’s capacity to draw 
ordinary people into politics.  This is indeed an important feature – what we have called 
elsewhere its contribution to the democratic ethos2 – and it is rooted in the good reasons 
individuals have to become partisans as these are discussed in the book.  But one should be 
wary of decoupling the value of popular mobilisation from the normative standards that 
                                                        
2 White, Jonathan and Lea Ypi (2010), ‘Rethinking the Modern Prince: Partisanship and the Democratic 
Ethos’, Political Studies 58 (4), pp.809-28.   
 4 
might regulate it.  No-one needs to be reminded, in the age of Trump, that spectacular 
mobilisations can be achieved for the sake of political ends that scarcely look generalizable.  
Over the course of the 2016 US presidential election, Trump Republicans not only 
repeatedly addressed a constituency they defined amongst other things as white, but often 
did so with the clear suggestion that it should be privileged above others because its interests 
were ultimately the only ones to matter.  The appeal is to a particularist group, pre-political 
in its composition, non-porous in its boundaries: either one belongs or one does not.  This is 
what popular mobilisation divorced from standards of justification looks like.  If one wants 
to defend party democracy, one needs to be clear on why Trump-like phenomena are so far 
removed from ethical partisanship. 
Daniel Weinstock offers a different take on the contending arguments of the book.  
In his view, if there is a point of tension it is in the contribution of partisanship to democratic 
justification on the one hand and to the capacity of individuals to fulfil their ethical goals on 
the other.  The conflict becomes apparent, he suggests, when one examines the different 
kinds of electoral system within which partisanship can arise.  Following a consensus in 
comparative politics, he associates first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems with ‘big tent’ parties, 
united around very broad commitments and aimed at widespread public support, while 
proportional-representative systems allow the emergence of niche parties, more narrow and 
targeted in their appeal.  The big-tent parties, Weinstock suggests, are the ones closest in 
spirit to partisanship as we describe it, as they seek programmes that can be justified to the 
many.  Yet in order to fashion programmes with widespread appeal, their members must be 
willing to sacrifice much that is important to them personally.  These parties are ‘sites of 
compromise’, indeed essentially ‘pre-electoral coalitions’.  If there is something 
praiseworthy about them, it is exactly how they cultivate the spirit of compromise – not how 
they enable the realisation of ethical projects with which their members can readily identify.  
The concessions needed to form such parties inevitably put some distance between the 
projects of the group and the individual: intra-party compromise is thus central to the ethics 
of partisanship. 
That the structure of the electoral system is a crucial real-world influence on the 
organisational forms of partisanship is a point we readily acknowledge.  There is important 
work to be done on the normativity of electoral systems, a topic the book does not cover.  
Our intention was to develop a theory of partisanship independent of the context of existing 
institutions, in part so their reform and even transformation could be one aspect of its 
rationale.  (This interest is clearest in the chapters on revolutionary and transnational 
 5 
partisanship.)  If one assumes institutions shape partisanship more than vice versa, one 
inevitably arrives at a rather domesticated vision of parties. 
But granting that electoral systems matter, we would take issue with the 
characterisation of parties in FPTP systems as coalitions of diverse constituencies.  This 
description bears the traces of the sociological reductionism the book is trying to get away 
from – an image of groups with predefined preferences, each seeking to negotiate the 
arrangement that best advances their prospects of power, each retaining their separate 
identities.  We prefer to see large parties as groups of those who share some rough 
intuitions, but who engage in an ongoing project of working out the common political goals 
that can unify them.  Unlike in the image of a coalition, their unity is forged in their joint 
activities – or revealed to be unattainable in the course of the same – rather than decided at 
the outset based on a strategic calculation.  That rings true to us at any rate of the parties of 
the quintessential FPTP system at Westminster, both in their steady evolution as mass 
parties across the twentieth century, and in their more recent efforts to redefine themselves, 
not least in the light of Brexit. 
What does that mean for compromise as an intra-party phenomenon and for the 
individual as a bearer of ethical commitments?  Though one of our chapters explores intra-
party compromise in the context of group obligations, the topic undoubtedly deserves further 
treatment.  It is highly relevant to the preservation of party unity, once contending sub-
groups of opinion start to emerge over the course of its evolution.  Weinstock is quite right 
to observe that intra-party disagreements can be as brutal as any.  But to see compromise as 
central to the formation of parties, and to the individual’s choice to align with one, again 
rather assumes clearly-defined preferences as the starting-point.  If, as we suggest, the ‘pre-
partisan’ individual starts out with looser intuitions, and the more defined positions emerge 
in the process of coordination (in line with our epistemic argument for partisanship), then it 
would be misleading to see them as embroiled in compromise from the get-go.  They are 
still in the process of refining their views, and there is no strong contrast to be made between 
their personal projects and those of the collective.  (This, one may add, is what makes inter-
party compromise rather different: here the encounter is between agents who have already 
sought to define the political goals they stand for as part of the process of becoming a party.) 
It is also worth noting that the parties that do relatively well in systems of 
proportional representation are not necessarily narrow in their intended constituency, and 
therefore no less conducive to justification around generalizable principles than those in 
FPTP systems.  Green parties or far-left parties may be at least as principled in this sense as 
their ‘big-tent’ cousins, and they can influence the larger parties without necessarily forming 
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compromising coalitions with them.  The size of the supporter base they draw is not the 
measure of their capacity to be partisan in the sense defended in the book. 
Given this focus on the development of partisan attitudes and formative practices, 
rather than the organisational and institutional constraints in which they operate, one might 
argue, as Nadia Urbinati does, that the book is ultimately ‘not about parties, but rather 
partisanship as a political category and as a form of political judgment’ (p. XXX). On her 
account, partisanship ‘entails identification with one part and does not aim at the support of 
all the citizens or becoming identical with the whole’ (p. XXX). But this seems to us too 
strong a qualification. Partisanship is about the search for unity through a combination of 
contestation and deliberation. Of course, unity cannot be taken for granted, and the 
agreement of those who think differently on matters of common concern needs to be 
actively sought rather than presupposed. Their reasons have to be engaged in processes of 
justification rather than censored, dismissed or ignored. But no partisan is ever content with 
speaking only for the part and not the whole. To defend that view would be to discount the 
distinction between parties and factions that Urbinati also wants to endorse. 
The idea that the partisan represents in practice just a part of the political 
community and yet, as a matter of principle, aspires to speak in the name of the whole may 
seem to point to an inescapable tension. As Urbinati sees it, this is tied with the recognition 
that partisanship aims at a condition that, if fully actualized, would render partisanship itself 
obsolete. And yet exactly this tension, Urbinati insists, should be seen as a productive one, at 
the heart of all attempts to preserve civic liberty in modern society. To seek to remove it by 
idealising agreement and unity would commit us to a condition whereby a part comes to 
dominate others, dogmatic and immune to self-doubt. Is this where our argument leads?  
Urbinati is right to emphasise that our account differs from one where parties 
contribute to a political modus vivendi constrained by ‘a noble’, ‘constitutional’ ‘pact’ that 
‘remains above partisanship as its condition and limitation’. But the notion of partisanship 
she puts forward as an alternative seems to lead to a reified conception of politics, whereby 
certain projects are removed from public scrutiny because, as she says, at ‘a certain point’ in 
history the decision is made to subject all partisan activity to the limitations derived from 
foundational legal principles and norms. To fix the limits to partisan activity in decisions 
that are made at a particular point in history removes history and tradition from human reach 
and turns them into an alien force able to command obedience for inscrutable reasons.  If all 
one can do is subject oneself to traditional constitutional authority and never question it, 
regardless of how political circumstances might change over time, how do we encourage the 
kind of political activity that Urbinati grants is necessary to democratic legitimacy?  
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In our view, partisanship is tempered not by the sedimentation of the past in legal 
doctrine or the veneration of constitutional tradition, but by the respect for one’s adversaries 
embedded in the commitment to certain standards of reason-giving and the ongoing attempt 
to make practice conform to such standards. Although the more specific application of these 
standards is undeniably informed by existing political tradition and legal texts, we also have 
an obligation to continuously problematise the latter in light of new political circumstances 
and the demands for inclusion raised by newly emerging subjects. In this way the process of 
political justification of which partisanship forms an essential part retains the potential to 
innovate and transform society in a fashion that preserves stability and acknowledges the 
ongoing concerns and commitments of other agents. This leads to a different kind of 
existential stance from the one Urbinati suggests, albeit not one immune to self-criticism. 
The partisan we have in mind need not constantly doubt the plausibility of her principles and 
aims, but can remain open to criticisms concerning how they are pursued, and aware that 
power struggles, ideological distortions or simply the contingency of events stand in the way 
of even the best political projects.  
If one takes justification seriously as a practice, the authentic partisan must remain 
willing to engage with adversaries, be responsive to public scrutiny, and remain open to 
learning from her mistakes. Self-doubt need not entail existential questioning of one’s 
strongest beliefs and principles. And self-assertion need not come in the form of a false self-
assurance. The partisan draws strength from the collective resources that she finds in the co-
pursuit of her principles with others, and encourages criticism by knowing that, as Urbinati 
emphasizes with Mill, even the best views need public adversaries in order to be thoroughly 
tested. This is why both the party as organization and partisanship as an outlook matter. And 
it is also why partisanship should not be reduced to a mere paradigm of political judgment. 
Partisanship is about embracing real collective agency in an attempt to construct a general 
will, as opposed to resigning oneself to being just a part in the exercise of the will of all.  
When collective agency in this ideal form is brought centre-stage, doubt and 
certainty do not pull apart but rather support each other. Views are made stronger by being 
publicly scrutinized, criticism is required for self-correction, and self-correction is 
understood to be crucial to further collective emancipation. 
